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Abstract
We study the changes in the consumers’ and producers’ surplus associated with ac-
quisition deals where there is a non-competition covenant that forbids the seller from
re-entering the market over a given time period. We find that these acquisition deals
can lead to significant negative (positive) changes in the producers’ (consumers’) sur-
plus, which decrease significantly with the time period of the covenant. We also show
that the effect of the time period of the covenant on the welfare change can be positive
or negative. It depends largely on the market conditions, such as the profit uncertainty
and growth rate.
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Non-Competition Covenants in Acquisition Deals
1 Introduction
Firms often consider the use of non-competition agreements in business acquisitions in
order to protect the acquired business from future competition from the seller. A non-
competition agreement is a covenant associated with the acquisition which restricts the
seller from competing with the buyer within a specific geographic area over a given time
period. The covenant also benefits the seller since it gives the buyer more confidence that
the anticipated earnings from the acquisition will materialize, enhancing the acquisition
price.
Non-competition covenants are also considered in employment agreements to protect
firms’ confidential information from their former employees whose departure raises the
threat of unfair competition, being the law literature on non-competition covenants in
employment agreements very extensive (see, e.g., Kra¨kel and Sliwka (2009), Bishara and
Orozco (2012)). The use these covenants can also play an important role in economic
development. For instance, Gilson (1999) and Hyde (2003) suggest that one of the main
reasons for the success of the high technology industrial district in Silicon Valley and the
failure of the one in Massachusetts’ Route 128 was the differential enforcement of covenants
not to compete - the different legal environments led to higher employee turnover and,
therefore, more firms in California (see, e.g., Bishara and Orozco (2012), Buente (2012)).
The non-competition covenants used in acquisitions deals should, however, be tailored
considering the specificities of the business that is being acquired and the scope of the
business that is going to be protected by the covenant, and firms should be aware that
courts may limit, for instance, the time span for which restraints could be justified (Gaby
Hardwicke Solicitors 2011).1
In this paper, we study the effect of competition and the use of non-competition
covenants in acquisition deals on the producers’ and the consumers’ surplus. We also
perform an aggregate welfare analysis where we show the effect of the time period of
the covenant on the welfare changes. More specifically, we show that acquisition deals
where there is a finite-lived non-competition covenant always lead to positive changes
in the consumers’ surplus and negative changes in the producers’ surplus, and that the
time period of the covenant affects significantly the changes in the aggregate welfare and
the producers’ and the consumers’ surplus. Furthermore, we show that acquisition deals
where there is a non-competition covenant have a significant effect on the aggregate welfare
change, which can be negative or positive, depending on the time period of the covenant,
1Most courts in the U.S. inquire whether these contracts are ”reasonable” and because there is not yet
a consensual theoretical framework to objectively identify and assess the ”legitimacy” of the competing
interests between firms, trial courts decisions are often not fully predictable (see Bite˙ (2011)).
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and the market conditions, such as the expected profit volatility and growth rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents the model setting
and provided the illustrative results. Section 3 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The producer’s perspective
Consider a monopolistic firm which optimizes production using the following linear inverse
demand and cost functions, respectively:
P = a− bQ (1)
C = cQ (2)
where P represents the output price, Q the output quantity, a > 0, b > 0, and c > 0 is
the cost per output unit.
The maximization of the instantaneous profit (pi) leads to:
pi =
(a− c)2
4b
(3)
We assume that profits evolve randomly, being affected by a multiplicative exogenous
shock (x) which follows a geometric Brownian motion (gBm) process given by:2
dx = αxdt+ σxdz (4)
where α is the risk neutral growth rate (drift), and σ is the instantaneous profit volatility,
and dz is the standard increment of a Wiener process. We assume that risk neutrality
holds and there is a constant risk-free interest rate, r > α.
For a monopolistic, the present value of the expected future profit flow is given by:
V (x) =
∫ ∞
0
pixe−(r−α)dt =
∫ ∞
0
(a− c)2
4b
xe−(r−α)dt =
(a− c)2x
4b(r − α) (5)
Now consider an acquisition deal between two firms, the above monopolistic firm, which
is the seller (S), and another firm, which is the buyer (B), where the former agrees to sell
the business (whose value is given by Eq. (5)) to the latter and leave the market afterwards.
Suppose, however, that the buyer is afraid that the seller may want to re-enter the market
after the acquisition. Therefore, it negotiates a non-competition agreement which forbids
the seller from re-entering the market during a given time period, T .
2Similarly, we would obtain the same outcomes by setting the inverse demand function as P = a− b
x
Q.
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If the seller re-enters the market, the ex-post (symmetric) duopolistic profit flow for
each firm, obtained a la Cournot, is given by:
piB = piS =
(a− c)2
9b
(6)
and the value of each firm is:
VB(x) = VS(x) =
(a− c)2x
9b(r − α) (7)
Following standard real options analytical procedures (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) it can
be easily shown that, without the non-competition covenant, the optimal time for the
seller to re-enter the market is given by:
xS =
β
β − 1
9b(r − α)
(a− c)2 K (8)
where xS is the seller ’s re-entry trigger, K is the investment sunk cost, and β is the
positive root of the characteristic quadratic function of the ordinary differential equation
that describes the value of the seller after being acquired by the buyer (but before its
re-entry trigger has been reached), given by:
β =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
−1
2
+
α
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
(9)
Note that, at the time of the acquisition, and in the absence of the non-competition
covenant (i.e., if the embargo period is T = 0), the buyer should not value the seller ’s
assets according to Eq. (5) because the seller has the option to re-enter the market after
the acquisition if x hits xS , being thereafter two firms in a duopoly. Consequently, the
value received by the buyer, if x < xS at the time of the acquisition, is given by:
F (x, 0) = V (x)− (V (xS)− VB(xS))
(
x
xS
)β1
, for x < xS (10)
where the second term of the right-hand side of Eq. (10) represents the value loss due
to the seller ’s option to re-enter the market after the acquisition. The existence of this
option reduces the value of the acquisition for the buyer.
If a non-competition covenant is agreed, the seller is not allowed to re-enter the market
over a given time period, T > 0. Therefore, compared with the case above, where the
covenant is absent, the value of the seller is lower because it cannot re-enter the market
when x > xS , but when x > xS ∧ t > T . These more demanding re-entry conditions
increase the value of the acquisition for the buyer.
On the other hand, an appropriate valuation for the buyer should consider that, with
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the non-competition covenant, it receives only a certain-lived monopoly market, whose
value when compared with that of a permanent monopoly is significantly reduced, given
that the seller can re-enter the market as a follower after the time period of the covenant
has expired. The solution for this acquisition investment problem is given by:3
FB(x, T ) = V (x)− (V (x)− VB(x)) e−(r−α)TN (d1(x, T ))
− (V (xS)− VB(xS))
(
x
xS
)β
N (−d3(x, T )) (11)
where N(.) is the cumulative normal integral, and
d1(x, T ) =
ln
(
x
xS
)
+
(
α+
1
2
σ2
)
T
σ
√
T
(12)
d3(x, T ) = d1(x, T ) + (β − 1)σ
√
T (13)
In the right-hand side of Eq. (11), the first term represents the value of the buyer if
the seller cannot re-enter the market (Eq. (5)). The last two terms represent the loss
in value for the buyer due to the fact that the seller might re-enter the market after the
covenant has expired if a given profit threshold is reached (x(T ) > xS) − the second term
represents the loss in value for the buyer if the seller re-enters the market at the time
where the covenant expires, and the last term represents the loss in value for the buyer if,
at the time where the covenant expires, the seller ’s re-entry threshold has not yet been
reached (if x(T ) < xS).
Therefore, at the time where the acquisition deal is agreed, the seller receives the price
of the acquisition plus a forward start option with maturity T , whose value function is
given by:
FS(x, T ) = VS(x)e
−(r−α)TN (d1(x, T ))−Ke−rTN (d2(x, T )) +
+ (VS(xS)−K)
(
x
xS
)β
N (−d3(x, T )) (14)
where
d2(x, T ) = d1(x, T )− σ
√
T (15)
and d1(x, T ) and d3(x, T ) are defined in Eq. (12) and (13).
In the right-hand side of Eq. (14), the first two terms represent the value of the follower
if its re-entry trigger (xS) has been reached before the covenant has expired - which is
equivalent to the value of an European option on a dividend paying asset with maturity
T which is exercised at T if x(T ) > xS . The last term captures the option value after T
3Derivations in similar settings can be found in Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007) and Pereira and
Rodrigues (2014). Notice that Eq. (11) reduces to Eq. (10) for T = 0 and x < xS .
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if, at T , x(T ) has not yet reached xS .
The acquisition leads, therefore, to the following value change for the buyer and the
seller, respectively:
∆WB(x, T ) = FB(x, T )− P (16)
∆WS(x, T ) = FS(x, T ) + P − V (x) (17)
where FB(x, T ) and FS(x, T ) are the values of the buyer and the seller after the acquisition,
respectively, P is the acquisition price, and V (x) is the value of the seller before the
acquisition.
Using the above value functions for the two firms we determine the producers’ global
surplus. More specifically, we find that:
Proposition 1. The acquisition deal causes a negative change in the producers’ surplus,
given by:
∆WP (x, T ) = ∆WB(x, T ) + ∆WS(x, T )
= (VB(x) + VS(x)− V (x))e−(r−α)TN (d1(x, T ))−Ke−rTN (d2(x, T )) +
+ (VB(xS) + VS(xS)− V (xS)−K)
(
x
xS
)β
N (−d3(x, T )) 6 0 (18)
Proposition 1 shows that acquisitions deals where there is a finite-lived non-competition
covenant, lead to producers’ wealth destruction (notice that VB(.)+VS(.)−V (.) < 0). This
happens because, ex-ante, the seller is in a monopoly, whereas, ex-post, after the non-
competition covenant has expired, the buyer will face competition from the seller, and the
effect of this expected competition reduces the (ex-ante) value of the seller. Additionally,
the producers’ surplus is also negatively influenced by the investment cost needed for the
seller to re-enter in the market.
It is important to highlight that acquisition deals of this nature can only be economi-
cally justified if they generate some type of synergy that offsets the above loss in wealth.
If firms are myopic, and ignore the above negative wealth change, they will overvalue the
benefits from the acquisition and will destroy wealth.
However, we find that when the time period of the covenant is infinite (T →∞), there
is not wealth destruction:
Corollary 1. In the limiting case, where T →∞, ∆WP (x, T )→ 0.
Proof. It can shown that: e−rTN(d1(x, T ))→ 0, e−rTN(d2(x, T ))→ 0 andN(−d3(x, T ))→
0 as T →∞.
For the other extreme scenario, as T → 0, we can easily show that the producers’
wealth destruction reches a maximum, and depends on x being below or above the re-
entry trigger xS .
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Corollary 2. If there is not a non-competition covenant, the producer’s wealth change
due to the acquisition is given by:
∆WP (x, T )→
(VB(xS) + VS(xS)− V (xS)−K)
(
x
xS
)β
< 0, for x < xS
VB(x) + VS(x)− V (x)−K < 0, for x > xS
(19)
Proof. Using the results of Eq. (18), we can easily see that, if x < xS , N(d1(x, T )) → 0,
N(d2(x, T )) → 0, and N(−d3(x, T )) → 1 as T → 0 and, if x > xS , N(d1(x, T )) → 1,
N(d2(x, T ))→ 1, and N(−d3(x, T ))→ 0 as T → 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of the time period of the non-competition covenant on
the producer’s surplus, where we can see that the surplus changes due to the acquisition,
∆WP (x, T ), are always negative and decrease significantly with the time period of the
covenant.
Please insert Figure 1 about here
2.2 The consumers’ perspective
Let us now analyze the acquisition deal from the perspective of the consumers, where for
a perpetual monopoly the consumers’ surplus is given by:
WC(x,∞) = S1(x) = (a− c)
2x
8b(r − α) (20)
For a finite-lived monopoly, where the buyer is protected by a non-competition covenant
over a given time period T , the consumers’ surplus are expressed by:
WC(x, T ) = S1(x) + (S2(x)− S1(x))e−(r−α)TN(d1(x, T ))
+(S2(xS)− S1(xS))
(
x
xS
)β
N(−d3(x, T )) (21)
where S2(x) =
2(a− c)2x
9b
> S1(x).
Proposition 2. The acquisition deal causes a positive change in the consumers’ surplus,
given by:
∆WC(x, T ) = WC(x, T )−WC(x,∞)
= (S2(x)− S1(x))e−(r−α)TN(d1(x, T ))
+ (S2(xS)− S1(xS))
(
x
xS
)β
N(−d3(x, T )) > 0 (22)
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The gains in the consumers’ surplus are due to the competition factor, (S2(.)−S1(.) >
0), and contingent on both the termination of the time period of the covenant and the
seller ’s re-entrance in the market as a follower. In the right-hand side of Eq. (22), the first
term represents the value associated with the scenario where the seller ’s re-entry trigger
is reached before (or at) T , and so the seller re-enters the market as soon as the covenant
time period terminates (if these market conditions hold), and the second term represents
the value associated with the scenario where at T the seller ’s re-entry trigger has not yet
been reached.
It also holds that:
Corollary 3. In the limiting case, where T →∞, ∆WC(x, T )→ 0.
Proof. It can easily be shown that: as T →∞, e−rTN(d1(x, T ))→ 0 and N(−d3(x, T ))→
0.
Corollary 4. In the limiting case, where T → 0,
∆WC(x, T )→
(S2(xS)− S1(xS))
(
x
xS
)β
> 0, for x < xS
S2(x)− S1(x) > 0, for x > xS
(23)
Proof. We can show that for x < xS , N(d1(x, T ))→ 0 and N(−d3(x, T ))→ 1, as T → 0;
and for x > xS , N(d1(x, T ))→ 1 and N(−d3(x, T ))→ 0, as T → 0.
The consumers’ surplus gains are, therefore, reduced by the existence of the covenant,
and vary from a maximum which occurs when there is competition but the covenant is
not in effect (contingent on x reaching xS), and zero when there is competition and the
time period of the covenant is infinite.
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of the time period of the covenant on the consumer’s
surplus changes due to the acquisition deal.
Please insert Figure 2 about here
2.3 A welfare analysis
In this section we perform an aggregate welfare analysis which combines the results from
the above sections for the producers’ and the consumers’ surplus. We conclude that:
Proposition 3. An acquisition deal with a non-competition covenant causes an aggregate
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welfare change whose sign can either be positive or negative, and given by:
∆W (x, T ) = ∆WC(x, T ) + ∆WP (x, T )
=
5(a− c)2x
72b(r − α)e
−(r−α)TN(d1(x, T ))−Ke−rTN(d2(x, T )) +
+
(
5(a− c)2xS
72b(r − α) −K
)(
x
xS
)β
N(−d3(x, T )) R 0 (24)
Corollary 5. In the limiting case, where T →∞, ∆W (x, T )→ 0.
Proof. See proofs of Corollaries 1 and 3.
Note that when T → 0, the producers’ wealth destruction reaches a maximum, al-
though this also depends on whether the state variable x is below or above the re-entry
trigger xS .
Corollary 6. In absence of the non-competition covenant:
∆W (x, T )→

(
5(a− c)2xS
72b(r − α) −K
)(
x
xS
)β
for x < xS
5(a− c)2x
72b(r − α) −K for x > xS
(25)
Proof. See proofs of Corollaries 2 and 4.
Figures 3a and 3b show the evolution of changes in welfare as a function of the time
period of the covenant, for two different sets of model parameters. In the former figure,
we use σ = 0.3 and α = 0.01, whereas in the latter we use σ = 0.15 and α = −0.01, being
the remaining parameters the same for both figures. Our results are interesting because
they show that the effect of the time period of the covenant on the welfare change depends
largely on the market conditions. For instance, in Figure 3a, the welfare change associated
with the acquisition varies significantly with the time period of the covenant (T ), but is
always positive, whereas in Figure 3b, the welfare change varies significantly with T but
can be positive or negative, depending on the time period of the covenant that is being
considered. This suggests that there is a minimum duration required for the covenant to
produce a welfare gain.
Please insert Figures 3a and 3b about here
Figure 4 shows the effect of profit uncertainty on the welfare surplus. For low levels of
uncertainty the effect can be negative, as the option-like flexibility gains are not sufficient
to compensate the seller ’s investment cost to re-enter the market. Higher uncertainty
reduces the minimum duration of the covenant that leads to welfare gains.
Please insert Figure 4 about here
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An interesting result is that, for some market conditions, there is an optimal time
period of the covenant which maximizes the welfare gain. This finding can be relevant,
for instance, for assessing and developing competition policies, and for the judgment of
litigation cases in courts related to the use of non-competition covenants.
3 Conclusions
Our results show that acquisition deals where the seller can re-enter the market after
the acquisition lead always to negative changes in the producers’ surplus. This type
of acquisition is, therefore, only economically justified if it generates enough synergies to
offset the surplus loss. Myopic firms overvalue, therefore, the benefits from the acquisition.
For the producers, the negative effect on the surplus is caused by the existence of
ex-post competition between the the two firms and the seller ’s investment cost to re-enter
the market. We also find that this negative effect can be mitigated by the use of a non-
competition covenant that forbids the seller from re-entering the market during a given
time period, and that the producers’ surplus losses decrease significantly with the time
period of the covenant. Regarding the consumers’ surplus, we conclude that acquisitions
deals with non-competition covenants lead always to positive changes, which decrease
significantly with the time period of the covenant. Furthermore, we show that the effect
of the time period of the covenant on the welfare changes can be positive or negative. It
depends largely on the market conditions, such as the profit uncertainty and growth rate.
Our results can have relevant implications on business acquisition agreements and
competition policies.
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Figure 1: Producers’ surplus change associated with the duration of the non-
competition covenant.
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Figure 2: Consumers’ surplus change associated with the duration of the non-
competition covenant.
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Figure 3: Welfare change as a function of the time period of the non-competition
covenant.
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Figure 4: Effect of uncertainty on welfare.
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